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THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Stephen G. Gilles*
INTRODUCTION
As Frank Easterbrook famously explained, "The Supreme Court is
a regulator."' One of the things the Court regulates is uncertainty in
the American legal system. In this Article, my main focus will be on
two types of legal uncertainty: uncertainty about what the law is and
uncertainty about whether the law will remain the same in the future.
The contemporary Supreme Court all too often creates (or fails to
reduce) both types of legal uncertainty without sufficient reason. Be-
cause space does not permit an examination of the Court's work as a
whole I will make my case by sketching several illustrations of damag-
ing Court-created legal uncertainty.
I assume agreement on the proposition that, all else equal, legal
uncertainty is disadvantageous because it reduces the law's efficacy
"in guiding the courts themselves, in guiding the behavior of the peo-
ple subject to the [law], and in guiding the behavior of the parties to
actual disputes." 2 On the other hand, reducing legal uncertainty inevi-
tably entails information, law-production, and other costs.3 Conse-
quently, determining whether there is too much uncertainty in a
particular area of law frequently requires a judgment call about
whether the tradeoffs are worth it. Readers of this Article will there-
fore have to decide for themselves whether they agree with my assess-
ment that the Court has undervalued the damage done by legal
uncertainty in the examples I will present.
Before turning to those examples, however, I want to suggest some
reasons why today's Court may be prone to discount or ignore the
costs of legal uncertainty. Since Justice O'Connor retired in 2006, the
Court has been divided four-one-four along ideological lines, with Jus-
tice Kennedy holding the balance of power between the four con-
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. Thanks to Laurie N. Feldman,
Daniel F. Gilles, and Nelson Lund for helpful comments and to Marc Galanter and participants
in the 2010 Clifford Symposium for helpful comments on a previous (and much different) draft.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1984).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 543 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1992).
3. See id. at 542-45.
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servative Justices4 and their four liberal counterparts.5 During the
previous decade, the Court was divided three-two-four along basically
the same ideological lines: the four liberals prevailed if either of the
two "swing" (or centrist) Justices-Justices O'Connor and Kennedy-
joined them, while the three conservatives6 needed to pick up both
swing votes to prevail.
Of course, the Court decides many unanimous cases each Term, and
many others in which the division between majority and dissent is pri-
marily legal rather than political.7 But the Court's docket is notori-
ously loaded with ideologically freighted cases. In those arenas, at
least, the Court's ideological division has unquestionably been a major
factor tending to increase uncertainty in the law. For one thing, when
ideological feelings run high, stare decisis is likely to carry little
weight. For example, since Justice O'Connor's retirement, the Court
has reversed course in several important contexts in which Justice
Kennedy had previously been in dissent. Two leading examples are
Gonzales v. Carhart," upholding the federal ban on partial-birth abor-
tions despite a prior decision striking down similar state bans,9 and
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,10 striking down im-
portant aspects of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation
that the Court had upheld just a few years earlier. Beyond that, a
good deal of constitutional law may turn on which of the following
events occurs first: the death or retirement of a conservative (or Jus-
tice Kennedy) while a liberal is president and there are not enough
conservative senators to force the appointment of a centrist, or the
death or retirement of a liberal (or Justice Kennedy) while a conserva-
tive is president and there are not enough liberal senators to force the
4. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.
5. Until recently, the liberal Justices were Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg,
and Justice Breyer. The list is now Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and
Justice Kagan. I acknowledge, of course, that the categories "liberal" and "conservative" are
somewhat crude and imprecise, as is the category "centrist," which I use to describe such diverse
jurists as Justice White, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy.
6. At that time, the three conservative Justices were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Thomas.
7. A recent article finds that 38% of Supreme Court decisions from October 1957 to June
2006 were unanimous and another 11% had only a single dissenter. Paul H. Edelman, David
Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, and the Supreme Court: A Challenge to
Attitudinalism 1 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-07, 2010), available at http://
ssrn.comlabstract=1564291,2010.
8. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
9. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
10. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), overruling McCon-
nell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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appointment of a centrist. On today's Court, actuarial uncertainty be-
gets legal uncertainty!
But even supposing that a stable five-Justice majority, liberal or
conservative, were to emerge, there are powerful forces at work tend-
ing to perpetuate the Justices' high level of tolerance for legal uncer-
tainty. In a provocative recent article, Craig Lerner and Nelson Lund
argue that the Supreme Court has become a bevy of "celebrity Jus-
tices" who operate more like nine independent political arbiters than
a court of law." Their critique-which applies to Justices of all ideo-
logical persuasions-incisively shows how Congress has allowed the
Court to veer from its role as a "genuinely judicial institution" to an
increasingly politicized one.12 At the same time, Lerner and Lund's
analysis helps explain why reducing legal uncertainty is a low priority
for today's Court.13
The extent of Congress's constitutional authority to shape and
structure the Supreme Court is underappreciated even in the legal
academy. The Constitution requires that there be a Supreme Court,
specifies the jurisdiction it may exercise, and vests the federal judicial
power in one Supreme Court and such lower federal courts as Con-
gress chooses to create.14 The Justices are nominated by the President
and must be confirmed by the Senate.15 To protect judicial indepen-
dence, the Constitution further provides that the Justices may be re-
moved only by impeachment by the House and conviction by the
Senate, and that their compensation may not be reduced.16 Apart
from these barebone specifications, the Constitution leaves it to Con-
gress to decide such fundamental matters as how many Justices there
shall be, how much they shall be paid, and just what their judicial du-
ties shall consist of.
As Lerner and Lund explain, Congress's initial choices concerning
the Supreme Court have by now given way to profoundly different
ones. Early Supreme Court Justices lived and worked together, had
no law clerks and no palatial courthouse, had a largely mandatory
docket that included many mundane diversity and admiralty cases,
wrote mostly anonymous opinions, and travelled around the nation
11. Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court's Cult of Celebrity,
78 Gio. WASH. L. Riv. 1255 (2010).
12. Lerner & Lund, supra note 11, at 1258.
13. See id. at 1255.
14. See U.S. CoNs-r. art. 111, §§ 1-2.
15. See U.S. CONs-r. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. Strictly speaking, the Constitution provides only that all Article III "Judges . .. shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour," but this has always been understood to mean that im-
peachment is the only manner by which such Judges may be removed. Id. art. IlI, § 1.
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hearing cases as circuit judges for several months each year.'7 Over
time, however, all of that has changed. To begin with, Chief Justice
John Marshall successfully pushed the Court to adopt the custom of
issuing signed opinions for the Court.'8 Although Justice Marshall
was able to keep his Court unanimous almost all the time, today's
culture of frequent concurring and dissenting opinions gradually took
root in the twentieth century. By 1948, the ratio of separate opinions
to majority opinions exceeded 1:1, and remains in the same vicinity
today.19 The practice of signed opinions, Lerner and Lund argue, has
inexorably encouraged Justices to develop their own individual
jurisprudences. 20
As for the Justices' duties, Congress effectively ended circuit riding
in 1891, and-at the Court's behest-gave the Court almost total con-
trol over its docket in the so-called Judges' Bill of 1925.21 The Court
has used this power to tilt its docket heavily in the direction of federal
law and particularly constitutional cases. Moreover, the Court has
gradually reduced the number of cases it hears from more than 200
per Term in the early 1920s, to about 150 by the 1980s, and finally to
roughly eighty in recent years.22 To help with this increasingly light
workload, each Justice has been entitled (since the 1970s) to four law
clerks (an innovation that began with some Justices hiring solitary
clerks in the late nineteenth century). 23 Not only do many Justices
delegate much of the responsibility for opinion writing to their clerks,
discussions between each Justice and his or her clerks seem to have
supplanted deliberations among the Justices themselves to a consider-
able extent. 24 And because clerks see themselves as employees of in-
dividual Justices rather than of the Court, they contribute further to
its fragmentation into nine separate chambers. 25 As Lerner and Lund
point out, the Justices today seem less concerned about the Court's
17. Lerner & Lund, supra note 11, at 1259, 1263-65.
18. Id. at 1277.
19. Id. at 1279.
20. See id. at 1281.
21. Id. at 1266-67. For an insightful history of the Judges' Bill, see Edward A. Hartnett, Ques-
tioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLum. L.
Ri-v. 1643 (2000).
22. Lerner & Lund, supra note 11, at 1268, 1286.
23. See id. at 1290-92.
24. See id. at 1293.
25. Although the Justices may pursue their individual agendas, they also have a collective
interest in maximizing the Court's power and influence. As Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana,
one of the few Senators to resist the Judges' Bill, observed, the Court's push for that legislation
exemplified "that truism, half legal and half political, that a good court always seeks to extend its
jurisdiction, and that other maxim, wholly political, so often asserted by Jefferson, that the appe-
tite for power grows as it is gratified." 62 CONo. Ric. 8547 (1922) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
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own consistency and more concerned about maintaining their own
personal consistency. 26
The result-a Court of celebrity Justices who have complete control
over their agendas-operates to increase legal uncertainty in several
ways. Here is a partial list: it means that many important legal ques-
tions go unanswered because the Court finds it politic to duck them
for one reason or another; it tends to produce outcomes in which the
Court muddles through without actually settling on a consistent ap-
proach or answer; it tends to weaken stare decisis and hence to make
the law less settled and more uncertain; and it tends make individual
Justices more willing to refuse to accept entire lines of cases with
which they disagree. In the examples that follow, we will see each of
these tendencies at work.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S UNPREDICTABLE APPLICATION OF
STARE DECISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The first example concerns the modern Supreme Court's treatment
of stare decisis, a doctrine that explicitly rests on a concern with cer-
tainty and predictability in the law. As the Court recently put it, over-
ruling established precedent "simply because we might believe . . . a
decision is no longer 'right' would inevitably reflect a willingness to
reconsider others. And that willingness could itself threaten to substi-
tute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stabil-
ity." 2 7 Beyond that, the Court continues to invoke Justice Brandeis's
maxim that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 28 At first blush,
then, the Court's commitment to stare decisis seems to show that the
Court values legal certainty quite highly.29
Once one looks more closely at the Court's test for invoking stare
decisis in constitutional cases, however, a very different picture
emerges. Stare decisis, the Court has often said, is "not an inexorable
26. To curb these tendencies, Lerner and Lund propose (1) abolishing signed opinions, includ-
ing signed dissents; (2) requiring the Court to hear one case certified by a court of appeals for
each case in which the Court grants certiorari; (3) stripping the Justices of their law clerks, and
instead allowing the Court as a whole to hire law clerks in more limited numbers, who would be
supervised by the Supreme Court librarian and allowed only to do research (not work on opin-
ions); and (4) requiring the Justices to ride circuit, as they did until the late nineteenth century.
Lerner & Lund, supra note 11, at 1259-61, 1294. 1 am sympathetic to these proposals, but my
argument in this Article does not encompass them.
27. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008).
28. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. On occasion, the Court has argued that stare decisis need not be followed because a well-
established precedent has generated great legal uncertainty. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74 & n.8 (1938) (critiquing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) on that ground).
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command."30 Instead, as the Court explained in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is cus-
tomarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic consider-
ations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision
with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case.3'
These factors include (1) whether the precedent has proven unwork-
able in practice, (2) whether there has been significant and justifiable
reliance on the precedent by persons in our society, (3) whether the
precedent has been eroded by other decisions, (4) whether the rele-
vant facts have importantly changed, and (5) whether overruling
would adversely affect the Court's credibility and legitimacy.32
Merely to describe these factors is to recognize that, as Michael Paul-
sen puts it, the Court's stare decisis doctrine "consists of a classic mul-
tifactor balancing test of incommensurable considerations." 33 Any
such test will inevitably generate considerable uncertainty about
which precedents are protected by stare decisis and which are not.
But it gets worse. After presenting a devastating critique of the
Court's inconsistent application of each stare decisis factor in constitu-
tional cases,34 Paulsen concludes that each factor "contains internal
contradictions," "admits of conflicting applications," and "suffers
from certain major analytic defects and unclarity," while the relation-
ships among them and their relative weights are left undefined. 35 "No
factor is necessarily necessary. No factor is sufficient." 36 In short, the
Court's stare decisis doctrine, on its face and even more so as applied,
leads to widespread uncertainty and confusion in constitutional law.3 7
What accounts for the Court's reintroduction of so much legal un-
certainty into the formulation and application of a doctrine that is in-
tended to do precisely the opposite? Clearly the Court's ideological
30. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828
(1991)).
31. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
32. See id. at 854-55, 867; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine
of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1199-1200 (2008).
33. Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1172.
34. See id. at 1172-99. Because any summary of Paulsen's critique would be a pale imitation
of the original, I have omitted examples in this subsection in the hope that readers will consult
the original.
35. Id. at 1200.
36. Id.
37. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Deciris as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WAs1. & LEE L. REV. 411, 414
(2010) ("[T]he modern doctrine of stare decisis is essentially indeterminate. The various factors
that drive the doctrine are largely devoid of independent meaning or predictive force.").
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division is a part of the story. It is striking that the Court's only de-
tailed explication of its stare decisis doctrine came in Casey and was
used by the five-Justice majority in that case to justify reaffirming the
"essential holding" of Roe v. Wade.38 Moreover, although Paulsen
supplies telling examples from several areas of constitutional law, the
most glaring contradictions in the Court's use of stare decisis have
come in its substantive due process decisions. 39 By entangling stare
decisis in the Court's most lawless constitutional innovations, the
Casey Court helped politicize and destabilize the doctrine of stare de-
cisis itself.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the value of legal certainty should
lead the Court to adopt a rigid doctrine of stare decisis in constitu-
tional law. There is a vigorous ongoing debate among constitutional
scholars about the optimal version of stare decisis,40 and I make no
attempt here to determine which is the better view. 4 1 The point is
simply that, having long adhered to a version of stare decisis in consti-
tutional cases, the Court's glaringly inconsistent use of Casey's com-
plex doctrine has created substantial legal uncertainty for no apparent
legal reason.
III. THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE AS AN ENGINE
OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
As we have just seen, the Court's approach to stare decisis in consti-
tutional cases breeds uncertainty about which precedents are safe and
which are up for grabs. Nevertheless, in cases involving the judicial
interpretation of federal statutes, the Court has consistently adhered
to a fairly strong version of stare decisis. 4 2 Remarkably, however, the
38. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-46 (1992).
39. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1185-88 (discussing the Court's inconsistent treatment
in its substantive due process decisions of whether a particular precedent has been eroded by
other decisions).
40. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 570-71 (2001); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Prece-
dent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008).
41. Paulsen, for one, argues that stare decisis should be abolished in constitutional law in
favor of a practice under which precedents, while considered respectfully, are given only
whatever weight their reasoning entitles them to, and are not followed if the later Court con-
cludes they were wrongly decided. See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1210-11; see also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Ef-
fect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALn L.J. 1535, 1538 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsi-
cally Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONsT. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
42. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) ("Considerations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress re-
mains free to alter what we have done.").
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Court has implemented a quite different policy when it comes to regu-
latory statutes that are administered by federal agencies. The Court's
Chevron doctrine, summarily stated, holds that statutory ambiguity
should normally be treated as an implicit delegation of lawmaking au-
thority to the agency that administers the statute-and, therefore, that
federal courts should defer to the agency's interpretation of an ambig-
uous statutory provision, provided that the interpretation is reasona-
ble. 4 3 Consequently, as Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in
Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council acknowledged, the
reach of ambiguous federal regulatory statutes is subject to rapid and
dramatic change-for example, when a new Administration with dif-
ferent policy views takes office.44
That Chevron massively increased legal instability in federal admin-
istrative law seems undeniable. On the other hand, the pre-Chevron
regime of judicial review of agency interpretations of regulatory stat-
utes was notoriously complex, multi-factor, and uncertain.45 Conse-
quently, Chevron also reduced the uncertainty associated with
predicting which agency interpretations would survive judicial review.
Over time, however, that advantage of the Chevron doctrine has
been undermined by the doctrine's growing complexity. Initially, the
Court's decisions (arguably including Chevron itself) suggested that
statutory ambiguity, without more, gave rise to an inference that Con-
gress had implicitly delegated lawmaking authority to the agency.46
Such a broad reading of Chevron made its application straightforward.
In United States v. Mead, however, the Court held that Chevron defer-
ence does not apply unless the agency both possessed and exercised
the authority to resolve the issue of statutory meaning "with the force
of law."4 7 This condition, Mead indicated, would generally be satis-
fied when the agency was authorized to (and did) resolve the question
through rulemaking or formal adjudication, as well as under certain
other (undefined) circumstances.48 Mead also held that agency rulings
that are not entitled to Chevron deference may nevertheless merit
43. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
44. See id. at 865 ("[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's
views of wise policy to inform its judgments.").
45. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. Rev.
549, 562 n.95 (1985) (identifying ten factors used at various times by the Supreme Court in
determining how much, if any, deference to extend to agency interpretations of statutes).
46. See GARY LAwsoN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 458-59 (5th ed. 2009).
47. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
48. See id. at 230-31.
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some deference, under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,49 where the agency
has relevant expertise that it brought to bear in deciding the issue.50
Justice Scalia, who had championed the broad reading of Chevron,
protested in dissent that the Court was throwing away the simplicity of
Chevron as "an across-the-board presumption,"5 1 while simultane-
ously reviving "the indeterminacy of Skidmore deference." 52 Interest-
ingly, the majority conceded that Justice Scalia's approach would be
preferable if the overriding goal were "to simplify the judicial process
of giving or withholding deference."53 But the Court placed more
weight on tailoring deference to its view of congressional intent. In
light of the wide diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary admin-
istrative action, the Court thought it "implausible that Congress in-
tended [to give administrative agencies] . . . either Chevron deference
or none at all." 5 4 On that score, Justice Scalia's view-expressed in a
law review article he wrote a decade before Mead-is that "the quest
for the 'genuine' legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase any-
way," and consequently "any rule adopted in this field represents
merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a
background rule of law against which Congress can legislate."55 Why
that background rule of law is more faithful to the Administrative
Procedure Act (the APA) than one that extends no deference to
agency interpretations of statutes, Justice Scalia did not say. Indeed,
in the same article he conceded that the framers of the APA pro-
ceeded on the assumption (which he termed "quite mistaken") "that
questions of law would always be decided de novo by the courts."5 6
One might think the intent of the enacting Congress should be con-
trolling, absent an express provision to the contrary in a particular
enabling statute. After all, the APA's scope of review provision com-
mands that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions . . . ."57
49. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
50. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
51. Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 250.
53. Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
54. Id.
55. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 517.
56. Id. at 514.
57. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see also John F. Duffy, Administra-
tive Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193-94 (1998); cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at
241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "[t]here is some question whether Chevron was
faithful to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act").
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Remarkably, the Court offered no response to Justice Scalia's claim
that Mead would result in the "ossification" of large swathes of federal
law. By "ossification," Justice Scalia meant that when an agency is not
entitled to invoke Chevron deference, a federal court's interpretation
of an ambiguous statute will preclude the agency from adopting a dif-
ferent (reasonable) interpretation in the future. The Court could have
pointed out that it is ordinarily advantageous for the meaning of am-
biguous federal statutes to be definitively resolved by judicial inter-
pretation. Prior to Chevron, federal courts frequently interpreted
ambiguous regulatory statutes practically de novo, while giving re-
spectful consideration to the administering agency's view of their
meaning.58 But having endorsed in Chevron the proposition that stat-
utory ambiguity should be construed as an implied delegation to the
agency, the Court now seems unwilling to acknowledge the downside
of the "flexibility" Chevron created.
In National Cable Telecommunications v. Brand X Internet,59 the
Court-again with Justice Scalia in dissent-confronted another layer
of complications attributable to Mead and Chevron. The statutory in-
terpretation issue in National Cable was whether broadband Internet
service constitutes "telecommunications service" under the Commu-
nications Act. Several years before the National Cable litigation, in a
case in which the FCC was not a party, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that broadband Internet service does constitute tele-
communications service. 60 Subsequently, after notice-and-comment
rulemaking, the FCC ruled that broadband Internet service does not
constitute telecommunications service. 61 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the FCC's ruling, declining to give Chevron deference and fol-
lowing its prior decision as a matter of stare decisis. 62
Among the questions the Supreme Court faced on these facts was
whether the Ninth Circuit should have applied Chevron notwithstand-
ing its own contrary precedent. The Court reasoned that under Chev-
ron, "it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps," and that this
must hold true regardless of "the order in which the judicial and ad-
ministrative constructions occur." 63 Accordingly, the Court held that
a prior judicial interpretation of a statute must yield to an agency's
58. Indeed, that is the gist of what goes by the somewhat misleading name of "Skidmore
deference."
59. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-74
(2005).
60. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2000).
61. Nat'l Cable, 545 U.S. at 977-78.
62. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
63. Nar'l Cable, 545 U.S. at 982-83.
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subsequent, Chevron-eligible interpretation unless the lower court
had adopted a construction that it held the statute unambiguously re-
quired.64 If the court merely adopted what it viewed as the "best"
interpretation of an ambiguous provision, the agency's construction
trumps the court's. 65
As Justice Scalia pointed out, National Cable creates considerable
uncertainty about the status of judicial opinions in administrative law,
because many of those opinions (especially those issued before Na-
tional Cable) might not specify whether the court found the statute to
be unambiguous.66 Beyond that, Justice Scalia argued that the major-
ity in National Cable was adopting a constitutionally dubious strategy
(subjecting federal judicial decisions to reversal by executive branch
officials) to ameliorate the problem of ossification it had created in
Mead.67 The Court denied that there was any constitutional problem
with its solution, but admitted that it was trying to avoid the ossifica-
tion of federal administrative statutes that would result if agencies
were barred "from revising unwise judicial constructions of ambigu-
ous statutes." 68
What is one to make of the ongoing Chevron story, viewed through
the lens of legal uncertainty? Although Mead reduced Chevron's do-
main, the Chevron doctrine (with its inherent uncertainty about
agency reconstruction of regulatory statutes) still stands as a central
feature of administrative law. Having bought into Chevron's premise
that statutory ambiguities should be regarded as implicit delegations
of lawmaking authority to the administering agencies, the Court now
simply ignores Chevron's uncertainty costs. Worse yet, it treats them
as a remedy for the supposed evils of ossification.
Perhaps the Court's thinking is that federal regulatory policy will be
improved if expert, politically accountable agencies rather than courts
wield the authority to construe or, more accurately, construct the
meaning of ambiguous provisions in the statutes they administer. 69
But the Court has never made a case for that debatable proposition,
let alone explained why a judgment of this sort should trump the
likely meaning of the APA. Beyond that, there is reason for concern
that the Court's judgment may be colored by concern for its own pri-
64. Id. at 985.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 1018 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1015-16.
68. Id. at 983 (majority opinion).
69. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.").
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macy. The pre-Chevron regime gave considerably more power to the
courts of appeals-particularly the D.C. Circuit-to determine the
meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes. Chevron's rhetoric is that
of a power-abnegating judiciary,70 but in reality, it was primarily the
interpretive power of the federal courts of appeals that the Chevron
Court ceded to administrative agencies. Moreover, as Justice Scalia
has observed, Chevron made it easier for the Supreme Court, in the
face of the ever-expanding administrative state, to oversee courts of
appeals' review of agency statutory interpretations.7 ' What is good
for the Supreme Court, however, is not necessarily good for the
country.
From the standpoint of minimizing legal uncertainty, the better
course would be to scrap Chevron in favor of an across-the-board rule
that statutory ambiguities should be resolved by federal courts, with
due regard to whatever persuasive considerations (including exper-
tise) may support the agency's interpretation. 72 Although Chevron
has had its ups and downs, no Justice has shown any inclination to
move administrative law in that direction. Perhaps more surprisingly,
while there is plenty of academic criticism of Chevron, the legal insta-
bility it engenders has drawn few complaints.73 The innumerable indi-
viduals, organizations, and firms whose interests turn on the
construction of federal regulatory statutes may see Chevron differ-
ently. For these parties, interpretive battles won are much harder to
translate into stable, permanent victories. And even apart from win-
ners and losers, the risk of sweeping changes in administrative law is
bound to complicate planning and invite rent-seeking behavior.
70. See id. at 866 ("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by those who do.").
71. See Scalia, supra note 55, at 517 (suggesting that "the sheer volume of modern dockets
made it less and less possible for the Supreme Court to police diverse application of [the] ineffa-
ble [pre-Chevron] rule").
72. For a proposal along these lines, see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experi-
ment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L.
REv. 779, 786 (2010).
73. Even Jack Beermann, who calls for Chevron to be overruled, suggests that "flexibility may
be a virtue of Chevron." Id. at 809. Of course, one could acknowledge that Chevron creates
widespread instability in federal law, but argue that Chevron should be retained because it en-
hances the ability of agencies to revise policy judgments in light of new facts or values. See Eric
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YAIiE L.J. 1170, 1215
(2007).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT's DISCRETIONARY CERTIORARI
DOCKET AND THE MAIL FRAUD CASES
Thanks to the discretionary writ of certiorari and its success in per-
suading Congress practically to abolish its statutorily prescribed
mandatory jurisdiction, the Court has had almost complete control
over its docket for decades. Under the Court-made "Rule of Four,"
the Court grants certiorari in any case in which four Justices vote to do
so.74 But on what criteria are the Justices supposed to base their
votes? Supreme Court Rule 10, entitled Considerations Governing
Review on Certiorari, states that "a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion," which "will be granted only for com-
pelling reasons."75 The Rule describes "the character of the reasons
the Court considers," but simultaneously warns that its description
does not control the Court's discretion. 76 To simplify somewhat, Rule
10 indicates that the Court is likely to grant certiorari only if (1) a case
presents an important question of federal law, and (2) either (a) lower
appellate courts have reached conflicting decisions on that question;
(b) the question is one that should be settled by the Court; or (c) a
lower appellate court has answered the question in a manner that con-
flicts with the Court's relevant decisions.77
As Rule 10 would lead one to predict, the Court's docket is domi-
nated by important questions of federal law. But which ones? The
Court wades into some lower-court conflicts, but allows others to per-
colate, sometimes indefinitely. And overt disregard of the Court's de-
cisions by the lower courts is rare. So the key practical question is,
which important issues of federal law will the Court decide to con-
sider? Rule 10 in effect "defined certworthiness tautologically; that is,
that which makes a case important enough to be certworthy is a case
that we consider to be important enough to be certworthy." 78 Nor do
the Court's cases supply a clearer answer: on occasion, the opinion of
the Court will tersely indicate why the Court granted certiorari, but
these conclusory statements provide no guidance for the future.79 The
upshot, as Edward Hartnett has written, is that "there is (virtually) no
74. See Hartnett, supra note 21, at 1647.
75. Sup. Cr. R. 10.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETrING IN THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT- 34 (1991).
79. See Hartnett, supra note 21, at 1723 (citing GERHARD CASPER & RICIIARD POSNER, TIH
WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1976)).
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law governing the Supreme Court's exercise of power to set its own
agenda, and the Court has steadfastly refused to establish any."80
In the absence of any law to apply, one must turn to the Court's
actions-that is, its decisions to grant or deny certiorari-to get a
sense for how the Justices set their agenda. Entire books have been
written on this subject,8 ' and I make no pretense to a systematic treat-
ment of it. Instead, I have chosen to focus on the Court's cases con-
struing the widely used federal mail fraud statute because they
exemplify the Court's often puzzling use (or non-use) of its power se-
lectively to intervene via the writ of certiorari.
The federal mail fraud statute (§ 1341),82 provides in relevant part,
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . for
the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, [uses the mails or causes them to be used,] shall be fined ... or
imprisoned not more than 20 years ....
In the 1970s, federal prosecutors began bringing mail fraud prosecu-
tions that went beyond the traditional understanding of fraud as lim-
ited to schemes to defraud the victim of money or property. Their
efforts met with almost complete success. Prior to the Supreme
Court's 1987 decision in McNally v. United States,83 every court of ap-
peals had concluded that "schemes to defraud include those designed
to deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible
rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their duties
honestly. "84
The defendants in McNally fared no better, and their case broke no
new legal ground. The defendants, a former public official and a pri-
vate individual, were in a position to control the selection of an insur-
ance broker to provide workers' compensation insurance to the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.85 The defendants concocted a scheme
whereby a portion of the insurance commissions Kentucky paid to the
insurance broker would be diverted to insurance agencies they con-
trolled. 86 The government made no attempt to prove that the defend-
ants' conduct had deprived Kentucky of money or property by
80. Id. at 1648.
81. See id. at 1646 n.11 (listing sources).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).
83. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
84. Id. at 358. For citations to the courts of appeals decisions, see id. at 362-64 nn.1-4 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion).
86. Id.
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increasing the insurance commissions or in any other way.87 Instead,
the defendants were convicted on the by-then familiar theory that
their kickback scheme had defrauded the people of Kentucky of their
intangible right "to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted
honestly."88
Under these circumstances, there was little reason to expect that the
Supreme Court would grant certiorari in McNally. The Court had re-
peatedly denied certiorari in "intangible rights" mail fraud cases, and
although there were significant differences among the circuits in their
understanding of the mail fraud statute,89 those differences were not
at issue in McNally. Yet the Court not only granted certiorari, it also
dealt the Justice Department a stinging defeat. In a terse opinion in-
voking the rule of lenity,90 the Court rejected the lower court
consensus:
Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in set-
ting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state
officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of
property rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.91
Justice Stevens (joined in part by Justice O'Connor) dissented, ar-
guing that the Court had no basis for overturning "the settled, sensible
construction that the federal courts have consistently endorsed." 9 2 He
rejected the application of the rule of lenity, reasoning that "the series
of Court of Appeals' opinions applying this very statute to schemes to
defraud a State and its citizens of their intangible right to honest and
faithful government, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of tan-
gible loss, removed any relevant ambiguity in this statute."93
In hindsight, McNally seems to have been a case in which the Court
granted certiorari because a group of Justices suspected that the lower
federal courts had acquiesced in a power grab by federal prosecutors.
After briefing and argument, that view prevailed, and the Court de-
cided to restore the mail fraud statute to what the majority saw as its
87. Id. at 360.
88. Id. at 352.
89. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010) (noting that there was "consider-
able disarray" in the pre-McNally case law over what-besides bribes and kickbacks-the intan-
gible-rights theory included).
90. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-60 ("The Court has often stated that when there are two
rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher
only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.").
91. Id. at 360.
92. Id. at 368 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 375.
325
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
original and more limited scope. 94 Despite the absence of a conflict,
the Court's decision to intervene was certainly defensible in light of
the statute's importance to federal prosecutors and the magnitude of
the error that the Court believed the lower courts had made. If any-
thing, one might wonder why the Court waited so long: there had
been a lower-court consensus in favor of the honest services theory
since 1982 at the latest.95
Congress, however, took a dim view of the Court's narrow interpre-
tation of the mail fraud statute. In 1988, one year after McNally, Con-
gress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which provides that "the term 'scheme
or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services" for purposes of the mail and
wire fraud statutes.96 Although § 1346 obviously nullified McNally's
holding that federal mail fraud is "limited in scope to the protection of
property rights,"97 there was wide disagreement about what Congress
put in its place. Congress made no attempt to define "the intangible
right of honest services," and that phrase was not a term of art in the
pre-McNally appellate decisions. As a result, the courts of appeals
have struggled to determine what is included in "the intangible right
of honest services," with widely divergent results.98
Having seen for themselves in McNally how much latitude the
lower courts were willing to give creative federal prosecutors in mail
fraud cases, the Justices might have been expected to grant certiorari
in the first § 1346 case that came their way. Instead, for twenty years,
the Supreme Court turned a blind eye to the confusion and uncer-
tainty in the lower courts concerning the meaning of § 1346's "intangi-
ble right of honest services." Then, early in 2009, Justice Scalia
dissented from the denial of certiorari in an honest services mail fraud
case.99 He argued that despite the best efforts of the lower federal
courts to find some limiting principle for the "honest services theory,"
Congress had failed to "define what 'the intangible right of honest
services' is, whence it derives, and how it is violated." 00 As a result,
Justice Scalia suggested, § 1346 may violate due process, because "[i]t
94. See id. at 359-60 (majority opinion).
95. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2936 (2010).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
97. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
98. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 n.36.
99. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
100. Id. at 1310.
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is simply not fair to prosecute someone for a crime that has not been
defined until the judicial decision that sends him to jail." 01
A few months after Justice Scalia's protest, the Court granted certi-
orari in two § 1346 cases (Weyhrauch v. United States' 02 and Black v.
United States'0 3) and added a third (Skilling v. United States) in Octo-
ber 2009.104 In each case, the Court granted certiorari on a specific
question that had generated conflict in the lower courts.105 But the
petition in Skilling also explicitly posed the broader question whether
§ 1346 "is unconstitutionally vague" if not limited to conduct moti-
vated by "private gain," and it was this question that proved deci-
sive.106 By a six-three majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court construed § 1346's "intangible right of honest services" as in-
tended to include bribes and kickbacks. 07 As so construed, the Court
held, § 1346 was not unconstitutionally vague. 08 But the Court also
acknowledged that a broader reading such as that urged by the gov-
ernment would raise a serious vagueness question. 09 Accordingly, in-
voking the familiar constitutional avoidance canon, the Court held
that the honest services statute should be construed to include only
bribes and kickbacks. 0 In light of that holding, the Court concluded
that Skilling had not committed honest services mail fraud and re-
manded for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to conduct a harmless
error analysis. 1 '
101. Id.
102. Weyhrauch v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009) (mem.).
103. Black v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (2009) (mem.).
104. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393 (2009) (mem.).
105. In Weyhrauch, the question was whether § 1346, as applied to a public official, requires
the government to prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty imposed by state law in
order to convict on a non-disclosure theory. See 129 S. Ct. at 2863 (limiting the Court's grant of
certiorari to this question). In Black, it was whether § 1346 applies to the conduct of a private
individual whose alleged scheme to defraud did not contemplate economic or other property
harm to the private party to whom honest services were owed, See Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari, Black, 2009 WL 75563 (No. 08-876). And Skilling asked whether § 1346 requires the gov-
ernment to prove that the defendant's conduct was intended to achieve "private gain" rather
than to advance the employer's interests. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Skilling, 2009 WL
1339243 (No. 08-1394).
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Skilling, 2009 WL 1339243 (No. 08-1394).
107. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931.
108. Id. at 2933.
109. Id. at 2931.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2934. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions concerning honest ser-
vices mail fraud in Black were erroneous, and remanded for harmless error review by the court
of appeals. 130 S. Ct. at 2970. As to Weyhrauch, the Court simply vacated the judgment and
remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the holding in Skilling.
Weybrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam).
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In concurrence, Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas) argued that "the intangible right of honest services" is un-
constitutionally vague.112 The Court's construction of § 1346, he
claimed, was "not interpretation but invention" in contravention of
the settled doctrine that federal courts may not define new federal
crimes.113 The majority replied that it is equally well-settled that "the
Court does not legislate, but instead respects the legislature, by preserv-
ing a statute through a limiting interpretation."' 14
To resolve this disagreement, it would be necessary for the Justices
to agree on criteria for determining when an interpretation of a stat-
ute strays so far from its text that "construction" becomes "inven-
tion." But in Gary Lawson's words, "as embarrassing as it may seem,
our [federal] legal system has no single governing theory of statutory
interpretation,"' 15 let alone a test for the boundary line between inter-
pretation and legislation. Rather than wade into these deep waters,
both the majority and the dissenters in Skilling were content to hurl
settled (and question-begging) axioms at each other. The attendant
legal uncertainty-how will the Supreme Court construe this statutory
language, and at what point will the Court decline to adopt an other-
wise sensible meaning because it constitutes legislation rather than in-
terpretation?-is so pervasive in our legal culture that we take it for
granted. The uncertainty costs of the Justices' inability to get their
interpretive house in order, however, will not go away simply because
we have gotten used to them.
Putting aside the dispute over interpretation-versus-invention, it is
hard to find fault with the Court's construction of § 1346. The major-
ity ducked an important and difficult question posed by Justice Scalia:
who owes a fiduciary duty to provide "honest services" under
§ 1346?116 But even Justice Scalia did not contest the Court's asser-
tion that "our construction of § 1346 'establish[es] a uniform national
standard, define[s] honest services with clarity, reach[es] only seri-
ously culpable conduct, and accomplish[es] Congress's goal of "over-
ruling" McNally.' "117
112. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2939.
114. Id. at 2931 n.44 (majority opinion).
115. LAwSON, supra note 46, at 507.
116. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2938-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2933 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for Albert W. Al-
schuler as Amicus Curiae, Weyhrauch v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2863 (2009) (No. 08-1196)). In
addition to summarizing the virtues of its interpretation of § 1346, the Court was acknowledging
(by quoting) Professor Alschuler, whose amicus brief in Weyhrauch presented a powerful argu-
ment for the very construction the Court adopted. See id.
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Nevertheless, the question remains: was it really necessary for the
Court to wait twenty years to determine the meaning of the intangible
right to honest services?" 8 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
Both before McNally and after § 1346's enactment, Courts of Ap-
peals described schemes involving bribes or kickbacks as "core ...
honest services fraud precedents," "paradigm case[s]," "[t]he most
obvious form of honest services fraud," "core misconduct covered
by the statute," "most [of the] honest services cases," "typical,"
"clear-cut," and "uniformly . . . cover[ed] . . . ."119
The pre-McNally case law "core" from which to fashion the sensible,
relatively bright-line construction that the Court chose in Skilling was
already in existence when § 1346 was adopted. To be sure, as Justice
Scalia pointed out, no court of appeals had adopted Skilling's bribery-
and-kickbacks-only construction of § 1346.120 But as McNally attests,
the Court was just as capable in 1988 as it is today of going where no
court of appeals has gone before.121 Indeed, given that § 1346 plainly
meant to resurrect the honest services theory as it had developed in
the pre-McNally courts of appeals decisions, there was less reason
than usual with a new statute for the Court to give the courts of ap-
peals first crack at delimiting the ambit of § 1346. And in any event, if
that was the Court's reason for waiting, it could easily have intervened
much earlier by granting certiorari in one of the many cases in which
courts of appeals gave elaborate consideration to the § 1346
conundrum.122
There were costs to waiting. Although bribe and kickback cases
apparently continued to constitute the bulk of honest services mail
fraud prosecution even after § 1346 was enacted, many defendants
were charged with-and some pleaded guilty to or were convicted
on-broader non-disclosure or self-dealing theories between 1988 and
118. During those twenty years, the Court did decide one other mail fraud case. In Cleveland
v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), a unanimous Court resolved a circuit split by holding that
§ 1341 requires the object of the fraud to be property in the victim's hands.
119. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring). Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2007) arguably
comes close, but later Seventh Circuit cases did not adopt his suggestions.
121. Similarly, although no court of appeals had ruled that § 1346 was unconstitutionally
vague, see Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928 & n.38, the three concurring Justices thought it vague, see
id. at 2940 (Scalia, J., concurring) and the Court's grant of certiorari presumably stemmed from
concerns about vagueness.
122. E.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 809 (2004); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1028 (1997).
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2010.123 Those who pleaded guilty or were convicted for engaging in
conduct that Skilling subsequently established was not unlawful under
§ 1346 should be able to bring collateral attacks on "miscarriage of
justice" grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.124 But of course the prospec-
tive remedy of having their sentences vacated cannot restore to these
defendants the years they lost in prison. More generally, federal pros-
ecutors invested enormous effort in developing and litigating these
now-invalidated theories nationwide. The result was great and pro-
tracted uncertainty about the potential mail fraud liability of any pub-
lic official or corporate fiduciary who engaged in unethical conduct or
breached a fiduciary duty. Uncertainty about potential criminal liabil-
ity, of course, imposes significant risk-bearing costs on risk-averse
individuals. 125
In short, a decent respect for the costs of ongoing uncertainty about
the scope of § 1346 should have led the Court to take a case like Skill-
ing years ago. One can only speculate as to the countervailing consid-
erations that carried the day for two decades. Perhaps the Justices
were not anxious to revisit an area in which they had provoked a
sharp response from Congress. Or perhaps they simply felt they had
too many bigger constitutional fish to fry. Whatever the reasons, the
Court has not revealed them-but nothing that comes to mind seems
remotely sufficient.
V. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES:
HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW?
My final example illustrates both the weakening of stare decisis and
the unsettling proliferation of I-adhere-to-my-views positions on the
Court. It is an example, moreover, that directly concerns legal uncer-
tainty in the civil justice system-the primary focus of this Clifford
Symposium. I refer to the Court's ongoing project of fashioning pro-
cedural and (more controversially) substantive due process limits on
common law punitive damage awards. The Court's decision to inter-
vene using constitutional law in the common law process of awarding
punitive damages was prompted in large part by the perception that
123. See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 38-43 (2010) (describing
the expanding use of § 1346 against corporate executives).
124. See United States v. Shaid, 916 F.2d 984, 992 n.10 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that after Mc-
Nally, "the courts have granted collateral relief to those defendants whose mail fraud convictions
were based on an intangible rights theory and whose conduct occurred prior to the statutory
change [i.e., § 1346]").
125. See A. MrCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCION ro LAW AN) ECONOMICs 83-90 (3d ed.
2003).
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some punitive awards are arbitrary and unpredictable. 126 Ironically,
however, the Court's creation of substantive due process limits on
"excessive" awards has generated an unstable and uncertain line of
cases whose very future is now in doubt.
The saga begins in 1989 with the Court's decision in Browning-Fer-
ris v. Kelco Disposal,127 holding that the Excessive Fines Clause1 28
does not apply to a punitive damage award. The Court declined to
address the question whether the Due Process Clause constrains the
traditional common law practice of allowing juries to determine the
amount of punitive damage awards, subject only to judicial reasona-
bleness review. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, argued
that punitive damage awards had enough penal attributes that they
should be treated as "fines" to which the Excessive Fines Clause ap-
plies. 129 Beyond that, they (along with Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall) signaled their willingness to impose some substantive due
process limits in an appropriate case.130
Two years later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,131
the Court reached the due process issue but arrived at no clear-cut
resolution. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion held that the com-
mon law method of determining punitive damages was neither per se
constitutional nor per se unconstitutional.132 What was the due pro-
cess standard for identifying those "extreme results that jar one's con-
stitutional sensibilities"? 133 The best the Court could come up with
was the exquisitely vague formulation that "general concerns of rea-
sonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is
tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus."1 34 Ap-
plying that standard, the Court held the punitive damage award in
Haslip constitutional.135
Next, in 1993 the Court struggled to apply Haslip's mushy "reasona-
bleness" approach in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
126. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2610 (2008) ("The real problem, it
seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards.").
127. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed ..... ).
129. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 297-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
130. See id at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
131. Pac. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1991).
132. Id. at 17-18.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 23-24.
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Corp.136 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion explicitly distinguished be-
tween the defendant's substantive due process claim that the verdict
was unconstitutionally excessive and its various procedural due pro-
cess challenges. Even when it came to procedural due process limits,
the Court was far from unanimous. 37 But the divisions were deeper
(and even closer) on the substantive "excessive verdict" issues. Four
Justices in TXO thought that the West Virginia jury's award of $19,000
compensatory and $10 million punitive damages in a slander of title
action was not so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process; three
Justices thought it was unconstitutional because it was based on arbi-
trary grounds (including animosity towards an out-of-state corporate
defendant).138 Two others (Justices Scalia and Thomas) argued that
the award should be upheld because there is no "'substantive due pro-
cess' right that punitive damages be reasonable."139
One might have thought that TXO raised a warning flag for any
Justice interested in joining a stable coalition to impose substantive
due process constraints on punitive damages. Barring a change of
mind on the part of Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas, only seven Jus-
tices believed there were any substantive due process limits. Moreo-
ver, there was a three-way split among those seven as to the proper
standard for determining the excessiveness of an award. 140 Indeed,
under the rule that a fragmented Court's holding is to be determined
"by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds,"141 it was unclear which substantive due process approach
qualified as the holding. In short, after TXO, the chances did not
seem good that five Justices could permanently agree on a particular
standard for substantive due process review.
The proponents of stricter substantive due process scrutiny were
undeterred by these indicia of instability. Defendants and their liabil-
ity insurers finally achieved their long-sought substantive due process
136. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
137. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White and Justice Souter, argued in dissent that TXO
was deprived of procedural due process because it did not receive "constitutionally adequate
postverdict review" by the state courts. Id. at 496 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 468-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 470-71 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 459-62 (plurality opinion).
140. See id. at 458 (plurality opinion) (explaining the plurality's approach); id. at 466-67 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (outlining his own approach to determining whether an
award is excessive); id. at 489 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the plurality's approach to
determining whether an award is excessive).
141. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
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breakthrough in 1996 in BMW v. Gore.14 2 A five-Justice majority
(Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and
Breyer) struck down an Alabama punitive damage award as so grossly
excessive that it violated due process.143 The Court looked primarily
to three factors to determine excessiveness: (1) the degree of repre-
hensibility attributable to the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio of pu-
nitive to compensatory damages; and (3) a comparison of the punitive
award to criminal penalties or fines for the same conduct.144 Justices
Scalia and Thomas continued to dissent on anti-substantive due pro-
cess grounds.145 Indeed, they indicated that they regarded stare deci-
sis as inapplicable, because the "constitutional doctrine adopted by
the Court [was] not only mistaken but also insusceptible of principled
application." 146 The other two dissenters, Justice Ginsburg and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, dissented on prudential grounds. They argued that
the Court had now committed itself to correcting mere "misapplica-
tion[s] of a properly stated rule of law," contrary to Supreme Court
Rule 10's indication that certiorari will "rarely" be granted in such
situations, 147 and they further argued that the Court was ill-equipped
for this project because it had "only a vague concept of substantive
due process" to guide it.148
With the 2003 decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
v. Campbell,14 9 the campaign to police punitive damage awards
reached what may have been its high-water mark. Applying the Gore
factors, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, struck down a
Utah verdict of $1 million in compensatory damages and $145 million
in punitives against State Farm for bad faith failure to defend its in-
sured.150 The Court announced new due process rules of thumb to
guide the state courts: normally, more than a single-digit ratio is exces-
sive, and if the compensatory award was substantial, a 1:1 ratio may be
as great as due process permits.'15  Last but not least, the addition of
Chief Justice Rehnquist (presumably for reasons of stare decisis) ex-
142. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
143. An Alabama jury had awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in puni-
tive damages for fraudulent repainting by BMW of a car it sold as new to plaintiff Gore. Id. at
565-66. The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2 million. Id. at 567.
144. Id. at 575-85.
145. Id. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 599.
147. Id. at 612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Sup. Cr. R. 10).
148. Id. at 612-13.
149. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003).
150. Id. at 415-16.
151. See id. at 425.
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panded the due-process-with-teeth majority from five Justices to
Six.152
In 2007, that majority shrank back to five Justices in Philip Morris v.
Williams,153 even as the Court's due process rules for punitive damage
awards continued to become more exacting. In the context of a claim
by a smoker's estate for negligence and deceit,154 the Court held that
it is a taking without due process of law for the jury to base a punitive
damage award on harm to third parties-even if that harm occurs in
state and is similar to the harm to the plaintiff.'55 A jury, the Court
ruled, may constitutionally consider harm to third parties for purposes
of assessing the defendant's culpability, but not for purposes of pun-
ishing the defendant "directly."1 56 Without reaching the question
whether the $79.5 million punitive damage award was constitutionally
excessive, the Court remanded to the Oregon court so it could apply
the Court's holding to that award.' 5 7
Let us take a closer look at the changes in the Court's composition
and voting preferences between State Farm and Philip Morris. The
six-Justice majority in State Farm shrank to five in Philip Morris be-
cause, although Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito voted as their
predecessors (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor) pre-
sumably would have, Justice Stevens-while continuing to endorse
Gore and State Farm-rejected the new due process ban on punish-
ment for injuries to nonparties.15 8 On the other hand, in Philip Mor-
ris, only Justice Thomas reiterated root-and-branch opposition to the
"excessive verdict" cases.159 Justice Scalia joined Justice Ginsburg's
narrow dissent, which merely argued that the court below had faith-
fully applied the Court's punitive damage precedents and had not au-
thorized the jury to punish the defendant for injuries to nonparties.160
Does this mean that Justice Scalia is reconsidering his non-acquies-
cence in the substantive due process excessiveness doctrine? Not nec-
essarily. Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court in Philip Morris was
careful to assert that its holding forbidding the use of punitive dam-
ages to punish nonparties was grounded exclusively in procedural due
152. See id. at 411 (listing Justices joining in the opinion of the Court).
153. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007).
154. See id. at 349-50.
155. See id. at 353-54.
156. Id. at 355.
157. Id. at 357-58.
158. See id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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process.161 In dissent, Justice Stevens pointedly claimed that the ma-
jority had announced a "new rule of substantive law."' 62 Justice
Thomas used stronger language: "It matters not that the Court styles
today's holding as 'procedural' because the 'procedural' rule is simply
a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime this
Court has created for punitive damages." 63 By joining only Justice
Ginsburg's opinion, Justice Scalia stayed on the sidelines in this skir-
mish. But that provides no assurance that he will recede from his non-
acquiescence.
Since Philip Morris was decided, Justice Sotomayor has replaced
Justice Souter, and Justice Kagan has replaced Justice Stevens. Only
two of the six Justices who constituted the majority in State Farm (Jus-
tices Kennedy and Breyer) are still on the Court. Assuming that
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito prove to be reliable supporters
of limiting punitive damages-as their votes to date suggest-the coa-
lition still contains only four Justices. Unless Justice Scalia decides to
acquiesce in the Gore-State Farm line, that coalition will need to enlist
the support of Justice Sotomayor or Justice Kagan.
To the best of my knowledge, both new Justices are unknown quan-
tities on these issues. It seems extremely unlikely that either Justice
Sotomayor or Justice Kagan will object to the punitive damage limits
on global anti-substantive due process grounds. Moreover, even if un-
persuaded as an original matter, one or both of the new Justices might
go along with those limits on stare decisis grounds. Alternatively, Jus-
tice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan might join forces with Justice Gins-
burg and subscribe to a much more modest and limited form of
substantive due process review-essentially returning to the nebulous
reasonableness test the Court used in Haslip and TXO.
I have saved for last the Court's most recent brush with punitive
damage awards: its admiralty decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker.164
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court, adopting a 1:1 ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages in admiralty cases, was based on federal
common law.165 Consequently, we can draw no conclusions from it
regarding the status of the substantive due process limits on excessive
verdicts. There was, however, one straw in the wind. Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, filed a brief concurrence: "I join the opinion
of the Court, including the portions that refer to constitutional limits
161. See id. at 353 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 361 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
165. Id. at 2626, 2633.
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that prior opinions have imposed upon punitive damages. While I
agree with the argumentation based upon those prior holdings, I con-
tinue to believe the holdings were in error." 66
Does this cryptic statement mean that Justices Scalia and Thomas
no longer believe that the Court's substantive due process, excessive-
damages jurisprudence is "insusceptible of principled application?" 6 7
Perhaps: to "agree" with "argumentation" based on "prior hold-
ings" 68 would seem to presuppose that those holdings can be applied
in a principled manner. Or perhaps not: if Justices Scalia and Thomas
were committed to accepting the substantive due process limits as
binding, why not just say so? Or perhaps it does not matter: the non-
acquiescence vel non of Justices Scalia and Thomas could turn out to
be irrelevant, if Justice Sotomayor or Justice Kagan proves to be a
strong adherent of stare decisis in constitutional cases. And on that
head-counting, head-scratching note, I conclude this brief look at the
Court's substantive due process ban on excessive punitive damage
awards-a venture that has consumed a significant chunk of the
Court's attention over the past twenty years and that now appears
completely up for grabs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution vests the federal judicial power in the Supreme
Court (and such lower courts as Congress creates), and that grant in-
cludes the awesome authority to declare acts of the federal and state
governments unconstitutional.169 But the Constitution empowers
Congress to determine by statute to what extent the Justices them-
selves have the freedom to decide whether and when to exercise the
power of judicial review. Since the aptly-named Judges Bill of 1925,
Congress has conferred almost absolute discretion on the Justices to
set their own priorities. 70 The examples I have presented in this Arti-
cle suggest that reducing legal uncertainty is-undeservedly-no-
where near the top of their list. In my view, that is one more reason to
give serious consideration to reforms along the lines that Lerner and
Lund propose, 171 in the hope that the Justices can be induced to be-
have more like members of a self-effacing, craftsman-like, and cer-
tainty-fostering court of law.
166. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
170. See Hartnett, supra note at 21, at 1644.
171. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 11, at 1259-61.
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